Battery powered communications equipment including mobile phones, handheld 2-way radios and telephone pagers have routinely been utilised in the initiation of IEDs however they have rarely been used as stand-alone IEDs incorporating initiation and main charge within the functioning body of the pager. Certainly, they have never been used on the scale witnessed on Tuesday 17 September when as many as
3000 pagers simultaneously exploded killing 12 and injuring 2,800 predominantly Hezbollah members,
with many suffering life changing injuries. Although the Israeli Government has not admitted
responsibility for the attack it is widely assumed that Mossad has worked on the pager supply chain and
the following day’s handheld radio ‘red button’ attacks for several years. It is speculated that concerns of discovery may have precipitated implementation earlier than planned and while Israel has been the subject of international criticism over the questionable legality of such an attack it was undoubtedly an operational success.
The injuries caused to those in bodily contact with the pagers when detonation occurred include lost fingers and eyes in casualties who were holding their pagers and fist sized cavities in the abdomen of those who had the pagers in their pockets or on their belts. Analysis of images of the injuries and device components leads IMCSE weapons intelligence specialists to posit that the IEDs incorporated small HE charges resulting in effects consistent with the detonation of HE and not with lithium batteries overheating or exploding as some reports have suggested. Each IED is believed to have included a one (see photo example) or two pinned micro detonator and a charge in the order of 20 grammes of PETN. Initiation may have been achieved using a unique coded signal which switched power to the detonator.
In addition to the loss of life and devasting injuries caused to large numbers of its members Hezbollah
leadership are likely to be impacted by concerns about what other supply chain interdictions may have
occurred and the depth of penetration of Hezbollah by enemy agents. Meanwhile globally, organisations
charged with the search for, detection and identification of explosive devices will need to reassess the capability of their explosive detection systems and procedures against weaponised pagers and similar threats. GW